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Abstract 
Reliability assessment is crucial when dealing with complex systems, especially 
complex networks. Be they natural or man made, networks are able to sustain 
their functioning by means of a reliable set of components. The many functions a 
network can sustain are direct consequence of the topological structure that 
constraints and, at the same time, defines, the dynamical relation between its 
components. Therefore, some kind of relation between structure and dynamics 
should be expected to appear. In this paper, some of these relations that have 
been found for the European power grid are presented. Evidences for a critical 
relation between topology and dynamics are summarized, using some basic 
topological measures widely used in the developing complex networks 
paradigm. Finally, strategies for optimal management and operation of such 
networks are suggested. 
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1 Introduction 
The relation between structure and dynamics covers much of the literature 
devoted to complex networks science [1]. It is now obvious that the structure of a 
network affects and determines its collective dynamical behaviour and, at the 
same time, networks can modify their wirings in order to adapt certain dynamics 
to a required objective function [2]. When dynamic processes exceed the 
network's capability to handle them properly, there appear dramatic and usually 
unexpected effects such as congestions and jams [3] or cascading failures in 
infrastructure and organizational networks. [4, 5]  
 
This last case is particularly relevant for power grids, where the most dramatic 
dynamical effects show themselves directly in form of blackouts and, indirectly, 
in form of huge economic and even human losses [6]. These major events, and 
the causes that generate them, are recorded and stored by public organizations. In 
Europe, this job is done by the Union for the Co-Ordination of Transport of 
Electricity (UCTE) and these events, given in total loss of power, energy not 
supplied, restoration time and equivalent time of interruption, are published 
monthly since 2002, and segregated by country and cause. [7] 
 
One first attempt to correlate network reliability measures and structural 
topology for the European power grid can be found in [8]. Given real reliability 
measures from the UCTE, it is found that there seems to exist indeed a positive 
correlation between static topological robustness measures and real non-
topological reliability measures such as energy not supplied, total loss of power 
and equivalent time of interruption. This fact leads the authors to classify the 
power grids of most of the European countries in two groups, namely fragile and 
robust grids, by means of a topological measure (see Section II below). They 
present both analytical and numerical estimations of the boundaries for network 
collapse under attack and failure, using a mean field theoretical approach.  
 
The aim of the following sections is the exploration of some more different 
measures that relate this behaviour with the internal topological structure of the 
networks. The paper is organized as follows. In section II, some previous 
findings are summarized and updated in order to justify more broadly our 
subsequent work. In section III, the mean degree is proposed as a first evidence 
of relation between structure and dynamics. Section IV presents the motifs 
abundance as another segregation measure between robust and fragile networks. 
In Section V, we present the patch size distribution as a third and more tentative 
evidence for network robustness. Finally, Section VI summarizes our findings 
and outlines some proposed strategies for an improved grid design. 
 
2 European power grid robustness update 
The European power grid can be described in terms of a graph ( )EV ,=Ω , 
where { }Ni vvV K=  indicates the set of N  nodes (transformers, substations or 
generators in  our  context) connected by the set of actual links between pairs of 
nodes { }ijeE = . Here, { }jiij vve ,=  indicates that there is an edge (and thus a 
link) between nodes iv  and jv . Two connected nodes are called adjacent, and 
the degree k  of a given node is the number of edges connecting it with other 
nodes. The mean of k  over V  is known as the mean degree >< k . Besides k  
and >< k , an additional property widely used is the cumulated degree 
distribution. This is defined as the (normalized) probability that a node chosen 
uniformly at random has a degree k  or higher (i.e., the fraction of nodes in the 
graph having k  or more edges) [9]. All European countries’ power grids have 
exponential cumulated degree distributions [10]. That is, the probability ( )KkP ≥  of having a node linked to k or more other nodes follows 
 ( ) ( )γkCKkP −=≥ exp  (1) 
 
where C  is a normalization constant, k  is the node degree and γ  is a 
characteristic parameter. Table 1 offers a summary of the basic topological 
features exhibited by the European power grids segregated in two groups: robust 
( 5,1<γ ) and fragile ( 5,1>γ ) power grids, as can be found in [8]. 
 
Group Country Short Form (from UCTE) 
Exp. Deg. Dist. ( )γ  Grid size ( )N  Mean Degree ( )>< k  
Robust 
Belgium 
Holland 
Germany 
Italy 
Romania 
Greece 
BE 
NL 
DE 
IT 
RO 
GR 
1,005 
1,086 
1,237 
1,238 
1,418 
1,457 
53 
36 
445 
272 
106 
27 
2,18 
2,11 
2,51 
2,70 
2,49 
2,44 
Fragile 
Portugal 
Poland 
Slovak Rep. 
Switzerland 
Czech Rep. 
France 
Hungary 
Spain 
Serbia 
PT 
PL 
SK 
CH 
CZ 
FR 
HU 
ES 
RS 
1,606 
1,641 
1,660 
1,850 
1,883 
1,895 
1,946 
2,008 
2,199 
56 
163 
43 
147 
70 
667 
40 
474 
65 
2,57 
2,60 
2,41 
2,53 
2,51 
2,69 
2,35 
2,82 
2,49 
Table 1:  Robust and fragile European grids, ordered by increasing γ , the  
 exponential degree distribution characteristic parameter. Size 
(number of nodes N ) and mean degree >< k  are also shown  as 
reference. The analyzed cumulated grid size is 96% of the whole 
UCTE size. 
 
For this paper and countries in Table 1, data from UCTE considered in [8] has 
been updated up until August, 2008. Figure 1(a) shows cumulated European 
power grid indexes for each group: percentage size (i.e., number of nodes over 
the whole UCTE size, which is 2 783 nodes), energy share (i.e., cumulated 
electricity consumption over the UCTE energy consumption), and power share 
(i.e., national cumulated highest load over the UCTE power generation). The 
energy and power normalization has been done using national electricity 
consumption and highest load on the 3rd Wednesday of December respectively. 
For year 2007 (last year available) these cumulated values reached 2 392 TWh 
and 389 GW for the countries considered in Table 1, respectively [11]. As we 
can see, grids in the fragile group (i.e., 5,1>γ ), though represent two thirds of 
the UCTE size, share almost as much power and energy as grids in the robust 
group (i.e., 5,1<γ ). Figure 1(b) shows cumulated European power grid reliability 
indexes for each group: energy not supplied (ENS), total power loss (TPL), 
restoration time (RT) and equivalent interruption time (EIT), which can be found 
in [7]. For each group, these values have been obtained as cumulated percentage 
of MWh (ENS), MW (TPL) and minutes (RT), over the whole UCTE cumulative 
value for the same time period. Equivalent time of interruption is normalized by 
definition. 
 
(a) Power grid indexes share
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
Size Power Share Energy Share
%
Robust
Fragile
 
(b) Reliability indexes share
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
ENS TLP RT ETI
%
Robust
Fragile
 
Figure 1: Power grid indexes vs. reliability indexes (updated August 2008). 
Networks in the fragile group, though share almost as much power 
and energy as networks in the robust one, accumulate between 
60% and 70% of the energy not supplied (ENS), restoration time 
(RT) and total equivalent interruption time (EIT). The total loss of 
power (TLP) is almost equivalent in both groups. 
 
 
As we can see, except for the total power loss value, there is an obvious 
unbalanced situation, being the share of the grids in the fragile group much more 
significant than that of the robust one. Sadly, network reliability data has been 
published only from 2002 onwards. This short statistical period is sensible to 
extreme and rare events. In November 2006, 10 million people suffered the 
consequences of a major event triggered in the German power grid (16 724 MW 
loss). Without this single event, the share in total power loss (TPS) would be 
60% for the fragile group and 40% for the robust one (where Germany is 
included). 
3 First evidence: mean degree deviation 
Node degree has been widely used to evaluate structural properties and 
connectivity distribution of complex networks [12, 13]. The degree distribution 
(i.e., the fraction of nodes in the graph having precisely k  edges), as opposed to 
the cumulated degree distribution formerly presented, is usually much more 
mathematically tractable. It has been stated that the cumulated degree 
distribution of the networks studied in this work follows an exponential function. 
By the very nature of the exponential function, it can be assumed that their 
degree distribution is also exponential.  
 
Here, a first evidence of a correlated tendency between degree distribution and 
reliability indexes has been done comparing graphs in Table 1 with the simplest 
graph we can define, which is the Erdös – Rényi (ER) graph [14]. This graph is 
obtained as follows: given a set of N  nodes, each pair of them is connected with 
constant probability Nk , where >< k  is the mean degree. For large N , the 
probability that a vertex has k  edges follows a Poisson distribution, 
 
( ) ( ) !exp kkkkp k−=  (2) 
 
The motivation to choose such a graph model is twofold: first, it is commonly 
accepted that the tail of a Poisson distribution decays qualitatively as an 
exponential function; second, the ER graph model stands for a generation 
algorithm with the smallest set of assumptions, thus being an interesting 
candidate for any null model. Therefore, equation (2) can be used in order to 
classify the robustness and fragility of the European power grids. To do so, we 
compare the actual mean degree >< k  of every grid with that of the Poisson 
distribution >< 'k  that best fits the real degree distribution and calculate its 
normalized deviation as 
 
k
kk
k
'−=∆  (3) 
 
Deviations from the ER random graph behaviour are shown in Figure 2. For 
every country, ordered by its γ  parameter, it presents a slightly exponential 
(broken line) increasing mean degree normalized deviation as γ  increases. This 
fact would suggest a more fragile behaviour as the network is less well fitted by 
the Poisson distribution, i.e. rather unexpectedly, as the network is less randomly 
designed. Observed deviations might be explained for several reasons, mainly 
variations in the topology due to planarity and network motifs. Unlike random 
graphs, European power grids are almost planar graphs in the sense that they 
can be drawn in the plane in such a way that no two edges intersect [14]. This 
fact is still under investigation and results will be published elsewhere. The 
possible influence of network motifs is analyzed in the next section. 
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Figure 2: Mean degree normalized deviation (equation 3) as function of the 
γ  parameter. Lines added for visual aid. 
 
4 Second evidence: network motif analysis 
Though global similarities may arise, networks might display very different local 
structure. This local structure can be characterized by patterns termed network 
motifs, or subgraphs, that appear at a much higher frequency than expected in 
randomized networks [15]. Functional or adaptive interpretations aside, network 
motifs can be used to characterize and compare the local structure of networks, 
even from different fields. [16] 
 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of three particular four-node subgraph patterns: 
linear, star and star with triangle. We group the last two together as they 
represent high connectivity motifs. We observe a notable increase of 
interconnected local topologies in spite of linear ones, as the fragility of the 
networks increases with γ . Although in order to be synthetic only grids with 
more than one hundred nodes have been considered (i.e., Germany, Italy, 
Romania, Poland, Switzerland, France and Spain), this behaviour is followed by 
the rest of the grids as well: fragility seems to increase as the elements of the grid 
become more interconnected and motifs such as stars and triangles began to 
appear. Although aging infrastructures, excessive power delivered through 
increasing long distances and other possible causes may influence the increasing 
fragility of the power grids, it seems reasonable to think that maybe, on a 
topological basis, the application of the (N-X) contingency criteria, which 
favours connectivity and interconnectedness, though originally intended to avoid 
interruptions in power service, would difficult, at the same time, the islanding of 
disturbances. Nonetheless, a grid’s dynamical model to certify this hypothesis is 
needed and already under development. 
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Figure 3: Subgraph abundances for power grids of size higher that 100 nodes 
as function of the exponent γ  of the exponential degree 
distribution. These subgraphs display patterns of change with γ  
that are not independent of each other. (Upper part: UCTE’s grids 
short form, from Table 1). 
 
5 Third evidence: patch size distribution 
For a last and more tentative, topological measure of the reliability of a power 
grid, we introduce here the patch size distribution. We compare the distribution 
of land patches enclosed by transportation cable lines for two different countries. 
The rationale behind this measure is basically inspired by concepts developed 
and used in (a) power distribution planning [17] and (b) landscape ecology. [18] 
 
On one hand, the objective of transport and distribution planning is to provide an 
ordered and economical expansion of equipment and facilities to meet the 
utilities’ future electrical demand, with an acceptable level of reliability. 
Considering the space as the substrate where the grid evolves and expands, we 
+
ES DE RO CH PL IT FR 
would expect a somehow regular distribution of substations and transformers, at 
least at a transport level, where the main objective is the distribution of bulk 
power in spite of population density or even geographical accidents. 
Nonetheless, power grids have evolved for a long time, usually without common 
long term planning criteria. It seems thus, that an optimal or even regular spatial 
distribution cannot be attained without redundancies and suboptimal designs. 
 
On the other hand, and keeping forestry, agriculture and farming aside, the 
principal actors in the spatial processes that transform and change the land are 
technological infrastructures such as roads, railways and, in a lesser extent, 
energy transportation infrastructures such as the power grid. These processes of 
land fragmentation and transformation have important and sobering 
consequences in economics, biodiversity, conservation, global warming and 
society [19]. Quantification of fragmentation through spatial indexes is currently 
becoming a common practice in landscape ecology and related disciplines [20]. 
Recently, the effective mesh size has been proposed as a fragmentation measure 
and a tool for environmental monitoring. It has been used to evaluate the 
evolution of land fragmentation caused by transportation infrastructure and urban 
development. [21] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Patch size obtention example for the island of Mallorca. The whole 
area totA  of the island can be fragmented into three smaller areas 
(or patches), with individual area iA . In defining the patches, 
double lines are considered single lines and isolated nodes (i.e., 
Cas Tresorer and Es Bessons in the figure) can not be used, as they 
do not limit the area contained in the patch. (UCTE map snapshot 
from UCTE website, http://www.ucte.org/resources/uctemap/ ). 
 
The effective mesh size expresses the probability that any two randomly chosen 
points in the region under observation may be connected (i.e., not separated by 
artificial barriers such as roads or urban areas). It is useful when the region under 
study is kept constant since it shows effectively the evolution of the land 
fragmentation over time. But it is of little use when the objective is to compare 
totA  iA  
different regions at the same moment of time, since a common normalization 
factor can not be used. 
 
The patch size distribution allows to overcome this last problem and to show the 
structure of the spatial distribution for different grids. We essentially consider 
cable lines as virtual spatial fragmentation limits and calculate the distribution of 
the size of the resulting areas (Figure 4). Political frontiers, seas and oceans 
would be the very outmost limits of the patches for every country. 
 
 
Group Country 
Grid size ( )N  
Electricity 
consumption 
(TWh) 
Served  
area 
(km2) 
Population 
(millions) 
Robust Germany 445 556 357 050 82 
Fragile Spain 474 261 493 519 42 
Table 2:  Comparative data for Germany and Spain (year 2007). For Spain, 
all data considered is peninsular. National electricity consumption 
for every year in the UCTE since 2002, can be found at [11]. 
Spanish electricity consumption and its segregation into peninsular 
and extra-peninsular data can be found at: 
http://www.ree.es/sistema_electrico/informeSEE.asp. 
 
Here, two power grids of similar number of nodes but different robustness 
behaviour have been compared (Table 2): Germany, a robust grid with 445 
nodes and Spain, a fragile one with 474 nodes. Though similar in size, Table 2 
shows some striking differences in population (and therefore electricity 
consumption) and covered area: Germany’s grid deals with more than two times 
electricity consumption than that of Spain, but in an area being 27% smaller. 
 
Figure 5 shows the absolute frequency of patches as function of their area, in 
square kilometres. Both distributions span for over five orders of magnitude in 
iA . But while the German grid keeps this frequency almost constant for all these 
orders of magnitude, the Spanish grid begins to strongly deviate for values of iA  
lower than 500 km2. Though the geography and area of Spain do obviously differ 
from that of Germany, a similar pattern but with different absolute frequency 
values would be expected. We insist this is a much more tentative measure and it 
has to be much further explored, but this fact would suggest a  much messier and 
intricate Spanish grid, heavily inhomogeneous at the spatial level and, 
consequently, much more difficult to control and more prone to failures of 
different kind. We notice as well the inherent difficulties that arise in finding two 
grids with similar size, each one belonging to each group, i.e. fragile and robust.  
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Figure 5: Absolute frequency of patches vs. patch size for Spain and 
Germany, in log-linear plot. The lower limit for iA  is 4 km
2. 
 
6 Summary and discussion 
The European electricity transmission system is a huge infrastructure formed by 
more than 200 000 km of transmission lines and almost 2 800 substations. As 
any other engineered system, it has been designed with a purpose: to deliver its 
2 300 TWh of energy in an almost faultless way and satisfy demand with 
production instantly. It is, nonetheless and at the same time, a complex system 
where unexpected and seemingly lawless phenomena such as blackouts and 
cascading failures arise. The aim of this work has been the exploration of some 
evidences that relate the outcome of this unexpected behaviour (in form of 
reliability indexes) with the engineered part of the grid (i.e. its topological 
structure). Although reliability data has been recently published and it can be 
biased due to extreme and rare events, a notable correlation has been found 
between networks’ cumulative degree distribution parameter γ  and reliability 
indexes such as energy not delivered, total loss of power, restoration time and 
equivalent time of interruption. There are three main tendencies that tend to 
increase with the fragility of the networks: (a) a deviation from a random graph 
null model degree distribution, quantified by the mean degree deviation  k∆ ; 
(b) an increased preponderance of star and triangle motifs in spite of linear ones; 
and (c) an irregular patch size distribution. Evidences (a) and (b) would suggest 
an increased fragility when the topology of the network deviates from a random 
one, maybe in search of a higher interconnectedness. This would suggest that the 
same contingency criteria that favours connectivity, though originally intended 
to avoid interruptions in power service, would difficult, at the same time, the 
islanding of disturbances: i.e. the more connected an element is, the easier would 
be for a disturbance to reach. Evidence (c) has to be taken with caution, as more 
work is needed in order to fully understand how planar random graph topologies 
can generate such patch size distributions. It is obvious that strategies for optimal 
management and operation of these networks can not be separated from its 
dynamical behaviour. The relation between probability distributions of reliability 
indexes, reasons of main events (overloads, endogenous or exogenous failures, 
etc.) and network’s topological fragility indexes, such as γ , are now questions 
under research. Engineers calculate, and calculation requires a theory or at least 
an organized framework [22]. It is our hope to define how these different factors 
constrain and are constrained by the real dynamics of the power grid in order to 
unravel the laws governing complex systems like this. 
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